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Disaster is a phenomenon in which civilization, the product of human 
accomplishments, is violated by nature. A careful examination of their disruptive 
characteristics shows that disasters can be man made as well as natural. This article 
discusses how natural disasters become human disasters, a configurative process 
which is ironically a product of human civilization and social structures. The sinking 
of the MV Sewol on April 16, 2014, which was one of the most devastating maritime 
accidents in Korean history, demonstrates that nature can destroy civilization—or 
“otherized nature.” Political power otherizes human beings and exceptional, inhuman 
occurences become routine. 
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The Power of Nature
The English word “disaster” is derived from two Latin words: dis (dislocation) 
and aster or astrum (stars or celestial bodies). Likewise, the traditional Chinese 
characters with the same meaning, 災難, signify the enormous power of nature 
overwhelming human capacity. To sum up, a “disaster” is a circumstance in which 
nature is perceived to be in discord with pre-existing conditions.  In this context, 
it is important to note that it is human beings that perceive natural phenomena to 
be either beneficial or disastrous. In other words, certain natural forces are only 
regarded as disasters if human beings suffer as a result of them.   
Human beings have always sought to control nature, but they are not 
powerful enough to do so entirely. As a result, natural phenomena, such as 
earthquakes and storms, have always destroyed human lives and achievements, 
and as such have been regarded as “disasters.”
This article aims to investigate how a natural disaster turns into a human 
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disaster with the help of insights derived from the work of Immanuel Kant. 
According to Kant’s analysis of theodicy, natural evil is distinguished from moral 
evil, and the idea of evil should be discussed within the realm of human reason, 
instead of directly connecting it to the notion of God (Kant [1791] 1996, 27-28). 
In a similar way, this article analyzes the essential causes and meaning of human-
induced disasters, rather than natural disasters, and their social structures. More 
specifically, I examine the sinking of the ferry, the MV Sewol, one of Korea’s worst 
maritime disasters, from the perspectives of Hannah Arendt, Slavoj Zizek, and 
Giorgio Agamben. Through a critical analysis of civilization, this article identifies 
the ways in which natural and political philosophy explain how disasters occur. 
In doing so, it demonstrates that disasters—which should be exceptional—are 
actually a normal part of civilization, and that they proliferate as a result of the 
otherization of nature.
This article adopts a critical standpoint in relation to political power, in 
particular, the way power reifies human beings and its capacity to transform 
inhumane practices into the norms of civilization, as happened during the 
Holocaust. I do not utilize specific religious terminology, but I do cite Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Emmanuel Levinas in an attempt to show that the governance of 
disaster prevention should be planned and executed in a religious spirit. As the 
title indicates, the core message of this article is that the fundamental causes of 
disasters are the otherization of nature and the reification of human beings.
Disaster as the Otherization of Nature
The Otherization and Resubjectification of Nature
Human beings instinctively abide by the laws of nature. At the same time, 
their intellect allows them to objectify the laws of nature. For instance, when 
prehistoric man learned to make fire by rubbing two pieces of wood together, that 
meant he or she objectified and recognized a law of nature—the creation of fire. 
Thus, human beings learned these laws of nature and passed them on down the 
generations. The laws of nature gave birth to technology, which is the origin of 
all our civilizations. Civilized human beings began controlling the laws of nature 
for their own purposes and identifying themselves as controllers of nature and of 
others (Nishitani 1982).
Although nature cannot become an “other” to human beings, it can be 
controlled by those who have acquired technologies. When this happens, human 
beings forget the fact that they are part of nature. As the idea of the Cartesian Self 
clearly exemplifies, modern humans perceive themselves as the principal agents 
of nature, while recognizing nature as an extension of objects (res extensa). This 
otherized nature does not embrace human beings and the ego is indifferent to it. 
Ultimately, human beings do not feel any sense of responsibility toward nature, 
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modifying and abandoning it at will.
In this reified and desanctified space, where mechanical rules created by 
humans to serve their own purposes prevail, human beings try to control the 
laws of nature onto which they project their desires and illusions. Simultaneously, 
nature loses its sanctity and naturalness and eventually becomes a multi-layered 
aggregation of human beings’ desires and fantasies.
In the meantime, human beings unwittingly become subordinate to the 
very technologies they have created. They cannot control civilization, because 
civilization itself is the product of otherized nature through a process whereby 
abstract mechanical rules force human beings to be subordinate to those rules. 
Gilles Deleuze observes that certain human actions generate entirely different 
meanings, and may ultimately lead to random accidents through the intricate 
workings of multi-layered desires (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 3-25). 
Civilization is not designed to look after human beings, as it is created 
through the otherization of nature and of human beings. Instead, civilization 
hands out cruel challenges at every turn.  The most serious of these challenges 
can be interpreted as disasters. Due to the way that humanity has rid itself of 
responsibility for nature, such byproducts of civilization occur outside the realm 
of human rationality and that is the reason why natural phenomena become 
human disasters. 
Nature’s Revenge
Technology is so standardized and specialized that it can be applied everywhere. 
Meanwhile, Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that “truth” based on humanity cannot 
to be found through method. He insisted that “truth” is the convergence of given 
information and the innate understanding of human beings (Gadamer [1960] 
2004). 
In Gadamer’s opinion, “what is called ‘method’ in modern science, remains 
the same everywhere and is only displayed in an especially exemplary form in 
the natural sciences. The human sciences have no method of their own” (ibid., 
7). Technology, as a method, has always existed outside of human beings; and as 
technologies become more complex, human beings become more dependent on 
them, and as a result disasters become more frequent. 
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster that followed the mega-earthquake in 
Japan, for instance, was essentially a counterattack by nature otherized by human 
beings. Simply put, the earthquake and tsunami were natural disasters, but the 
subsequent meltdowns at the nuclear power plant constituted a human disaster. 
This is the fundamental difference between a natural disaster and a human 
disaster. 
From a microscopic perspective, the generation of energy during nuclear 
fission appears to be a natural phenomenon. Though the generation of nuclear 
energy is based on the laws of nature, it does not occur naturally; instead it 
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occurs in a way that is highly objectified and manipulated by human beings. The 
problem is that although human beings appear to be in control of this process, it 
is actually beyond human control.1 
Another problem is that nuclear technology is in the hands of a few 
technicians. Disasters are more likely to occur when a technology is controlled 
by only a few specialists who assume responsibility for others’ lives. Furthermore, 
as nuclear technology is divided into many different specialist areas, it becomes 
more and more difficult for any of these specialists to understand the overall 
workings of a nuclear plant. This kind of situation is itself a recipe for disaster.
In a technocratic society, the public are excluded from the policymaking 
process in the name of efficiency and certainty, and this is a direct contradiction 
of the essence of democracy (Kang 2011, 20). Disasters themselves may be 
“democratic,” in that they affect large numbers of people, but the way that they 
are dealt with can be dictatorial. According to the disaster equation proposed 
by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,2 
professionalism increases risk (ibid., 24-27). From a strictly theoretical 
standpoint, nuclear fission itself does not cause disasters, but despite this, we have 
already witnessed tragedies at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima.
Likewise, nobody anticipates that a ship will sink when it is being built and 
launched. Nevertheless, there have been numerous maritime accidents, from 
the sinking of the Titanic to the wreck of the Costa Concordia and, of course, the 
sinking of the Sewol. These examples show that human beings cannot perfectly 
control the laws of nature. All anyone can do is estimate the durability of the 
vessels concerned and replace dysfunctional parts, etc. Meanwhile, when human 
beings are overconfident and fail to do their best to prevent accidents, disasters 
are inevitable. 
This is the view of the Yale University sociologist Charles Perrow, who points 
out that accidents are bound to happen in a society that is so dependent on high-
risk technologies, regardless of the safeguards. Perrow has described tragedies 
of this kind as “normal accidents.” Jaeyeol Yee, another scholar who has studied 
the sociology of disaster, argues that occurances such as the Bhopal disaster, 
the radiation leak at Three Mile Island, and the explosion of the space shuttle 
Challenger show that small mechanical faults can result in tragic outcomes by 
influencing other parts and structures (Perrow 1999; Yee 2004, 146).
As I have explained above, a society that uses state-of-the-art technologies 
is a high-risk society. As Ulrich Beck convincingly argues in his book Risk 
Society, civilization itself creates risk by generating side effects that are beyond 
the purview of human beings’ rational planning  (Beck 1986). From this point of 
view, it is clear that risk is built into society.
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Disaster and the Reification of Human Beings
Cognitive Fluidity and the Reification of Religion 
Besides the accidental disasters discussed above, there are also many more 
disasters that are created deliberately by human beings themselves, such as 
genocides and crimes against humanity. Man-made disasters of this kind are the 
worst kind of catastrophes that human beings can inflict upon each other, and 
their repercussions are far more direct than those of natural disasters. How come 
human beings are both the cause and the victims of disasters? To answer this 
question we need to look at the otherization and reification of human beings. 
Steve Mithen, a cognitive archaeologist, argues that cognitive fluidity 
developed once humans began to apply their ability to instrumentalize and 
exploit nature to other humans. Though it is true that cognitive fluidity has 
inspired the development of science, the arts, and religion, it has also been 
manipulated to emphasize the superiority or the savagery of certain  races and, 
eventually, to discriminate between them on that basis (Mithen 1996, 196-197). 
The effects of cognitive fluidity are evident in the ambivalent attitude of 
primitive tribes toward the animals they hunted for food, which they may also 
have worshipped or deified (ibid., 274). Even in contemporary societies, it is 
possible to witness cognitive fluidity in the way that some people cherish their 
pets more than their neighbors, or care more for TV stars than their own family 
members.
Attitudes toward religion are similar to the examples mentioned above. 
Although religion can be a response to philosophical inquiry from deep within 
the individual, to non-believers religions are merely an extension of objects, 
and even believers of one specific faith will regard other religions as heretical. 
Rather than understanding and sympathizing with each other through religious 
experience, people use their beliefs to build barriers, a sign of the “reification of 
religion,” something which according to Wilfred Cantwell Smith began in the 
West and spread to the rest of the world in the nineteenth century (Smith [1964] 
1991, chap. 2). These reified and inhumane religions have occasionally been used 
as criteria for discrimination. In a broad sense, reified religions may be seen as 
evidence of the presence of cognitive fluidity even today.  
The Holocaust, one of the worst tragedies in history, shows just how 
disastrous the “reification of religion and human beings” can be. The Nazis tried 
to justify their crimes by reifying and dehumanizing the Jews in Auschwitz, 
something which Hannah Arendt analyzed so well.
Conceptual Blending and the Banality of Evil
After having attended the trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, Hannah 
Arendt published a book entitled Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality 
of Evil. But how can something as exceptional as evil ever be banal? Arendt 
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concluded that evil stems from a lack of the ability to empathize with others. In 
other words, the Holocaust was not so much the result of intentional cruelty as “an 
inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of someone else” (Arendt 
1963, 44). If people do not care for others and only focus on their own daily lives, 
they are likely to reify others and be indifferent to them. 
The Italian-Jewish writer and Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi believed that in 
the eyes of anti-Semites, Jews were subhuman. He said that Jews in Auschwitz “are 
overcome before they can adapt themselves; they are beaten by time; they do not 
begin to learn German, to disentangle the infernal knot of laws and prohibition 
until their body is already in decay, and nothing can save them from selections or 
from death by exhaustion” (Levi 1996, 90). Jews were even hunted like animals, 
an indication that the main cause of the Holocaust might have been a lack of 
empathy resulting from the reification of human beings. The lack of an ability 
to empathize with others can also explain the inhumane practice of slavery and 
massacres such as those committed around the time of Korea’s liberation from 
Japan. 
In an effort to explain the intertwining of the concepts of human beings and 
objects, the cognitive scientists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner introduced 
the idea of “conceptual blending” which accords with the ideas of Steve Mithen 
mentioned above (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 17-38). They claim that 
conceptual blending  influenced  various human accomplishments and  worked 
as a basic mental operation in language, art, science, magic and ritual, and the 
simplest mental events in everyday life (ibid., 3-15). 
Conceptual blending also serves as a logical basis for explaining a variety 
of disasters that result from the reification of human beings, including the 
Holocaust. Fauconnier and Turner introduce a dehumanized area in mental space 
that results from the merging of input space into a blended space. Such conceptual 
blending is clearly illustrated in the process of the Holocaust, during which the 
administrative system integrated with genocide (ibid., 39-58). 
As Levi statesd, Nazis devised various “precautions, in order to keep the 
secret, only cautious and cynical euphemisms were employed by the official 
language: one did not write ‘extermination’ but ‘final solution,’ not ‘deportation’ 
but ‘transfer,’ not ‘killing by gas’ but ‘special treatment’” (Levi [1965] 1995, 213). 
As the terminology of genocide was transformed into mundane words, the 
Holocaust became a part of everyday life. Charles Fred Alford describes it thus: 
If you go to the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C., you may find that it is 
not the photographs, or even the piles of shoes and hair, that overcome you. For 
better or worse, many seem to have become immune to the pathos of such images. 
Overwhelming is the perverse rationality of it all, the elaborate categories of beings 
to be destroyed, the Institutes for Racial Hygiene, the Offices of Purification of the 
Reich, the Departments of Special Procedures. The Holocaust was science, industry, 
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and bureaucracy driven by images of doom, impurity, and dread, the stuff of 
precategorical evil (Alford 1997, 81).
This illustrates how genocide was transformed into formal administrative 
procedures. In other words, “Holocaust perpetrators recognized homicides as 
mere administrative executions in their own ‘mental space’, because they had 
integrated those two different actions” (Lee 2012, 343). Through this process, 
“mass murder and routine had become one. Normality itself had become 
exceedingly abnormal” (Browning 1982).
In arguing for four months during his trial that, being a mere lieutenant 
colonel, he could not be held responsible for the crimes of which he was 
accused, Eichmann was demonstrating the blending of two actions—killing and 
administrative behavior. Returning to Arendt’s explanation, Eichmann behaved 
as he did because he lacked the ability to imagine the pain of others, and also 
because “the imaginative structure of that time was dominant in Eichmann, that 
‘Jews are animals/objects’, ‘genocides are administrative procedures’, and ‘killings 
are the final solution’” (Lee 2012, 355). Within the blended space of Eichmann’s 
imagination, human beings were merely the ordinary objects of administrative 
procedures. This was the main cause of the genocide, and as long as we lack the 
ability to empathize with others inhumane disasters will continue to occur. This is 
how evil becomes banal.
Disasters: Normality Accumulated
The Sewol disaster painfully highlights structural issues in Korea.  If the ferry had 
not sunk, it would have continued to operate as usual. In the blended space of 
those responsible for its operation, the ferry was never going to sink, despite there 
being some safety concerns. However, the accumulation of everyday evils can 
eventually bring about catastrophes.  Indeed, most disasters that have occurred 
recently in Korea have been the result of an accumulation of ordinary events (Yee 
and Kim 2004, 164-165). The Seongsu bridge collapse in 1994, the collapse of 
the Sampoong department store in 1995, the Daegu subway fire in 2003, and the 
collapse of the Mauna resort in Gyeongju and the Sewol ferry disaster in 2014 
can all be attributed to the banality of evil, the reification of human beings, and a 
failure to empathize with others. 
From the point of view of organization theory, disasters caused by the 
accumulation of ordinary events are “bred within a culture that undermines pre-
existing procedures. And these risk factors occur all at the same time, thereby 
threatening a society’s subordinate structures” (ibid., 165). “Based on these 
definitions, it can be inferred that many human disasters result from a culture of 
not recognizing and ignoring precautions. … there are often ample signs before 
each accident, but they are either ignored or misinterpreted and that is how risk 
factors accumulate to the point where they cause disasters” (ibid., 169).3  Signs of 
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an impending disaster are ignored or distorted by routine everyday practice.
Agreeing with Arendt’s analysis, Slavoj Zizek argues that atrocities such 
as genocides are the result of banality.  He mentions how Stalin’s daughter 
remembered her father as a generous and benevolent leader and claimed that 
he was falsely accused of committing mass murder by his state security chief, 
Lavrenti Beria. Meanwhile, Beria’s son also claimed that his father was an 
affectionate man who only obeyed Stalin’s orders. The son of Georgy Malenkov, 
Stalin’s successor, repeated a similar narrative (Zizek 2008, 47). To their family 
members, Stalin, Beria, and Malenkov, as well as Eichmann, were all ordinary 
men. However, they all ignored the disastrous results of their decisions—they 
were blind to how their administrative acts could lead to acts of killing. Regarding 
the banality of evil, Zizek said:
Hannah Arendt was right: these figures were not personifications of sublime 
Byronesque demonic evil: the gap between their intimate experience and the horror 
of their acts was immense. The experience that we have of our lives from within, the 
story we tell ourselves about ourselves in order to account for what we are doing, is 
fundamentally a lie—the truth lies outside, in what we do (ibid., 47).
According Zizek’s analysis, the majority of those “condemned at Stalinist 
show trials faced the firing squad professing their innocence and their love for 
Stalin,” and this was a “pathetic gesture aimed at redeeming their image in the 
eyes of the big Other” (ibid., 51). Displaying ruthless violence against an enemy 
while showing humanity and kindness toward their own group members and 
slaughtering hostages while writing heart-felt letters to their families are all 
examples of hypocracy in Zizek’s eyes. Zizek goes even further in suspecting that 
declarations of love to one’s nearest and dearest at times of imminent catastrophe, 
such as just before a plane crash, are also hypocritical, like those who seek to 
make their peace with God on their deathbeds.   
Although our society is more diversified than ever, and seems to value that 
diversity, this pluralization ironically tends to exclude strangers, namely others, 
from its architecture. When one enters a pluralized individual space, one does 
not question the existence of others. The universal claim that one should love 
humanity in its entirety could be a fallacy, as no one can be a brother or sister to 
everyone. Speaking of “neighbors” totally excludes neighbors. This is why Zizek 
says that “the Neighbor is a thing” (ibid. 46, 59). The reification of neighbors is 
equivalent to the impersonalization of others. 
As is the case in the sinking of the Sewol and its aftermath, the cries 
of victims are heard everywhere, but there is as yet no social apparatus to 
connect these individual cries, despite the fact that those who lost their loved 
ones desperately want one. It is not too much to say that such a deficiency is a 
characteristic of the modern nation-state. The paradox of the modern disaster is 
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that although disasters should be exceptional, they are actually a normal part of 
life.
Homo Sacer and the Normalization of Exceptions
In his volume, Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben clearly illustrates the normalization 
of exception (Agamben 1998).4 Under ancient Roman law, homo sacer (“sacred 
man” or “accursed man”) is an individual that cannot be sacrificed to the gods 
and can be murdered with impunity. By not being a candidate for sacrifice, 
the homo sacer is excluded from the religious order, and the fact that he can be 
murdered with impunity means he is also excluded from the legal order (ibid., 
71).5 
According to Agamben, the creation of a homo sacer, which is called 
sacratio, involves the conjunction of two traits: immunity from prosecution for 
murder and exclusion from sacrifice (ibid., 81). Agamben calls this the state of 
exception, and the modern power justifies its existence by making exceptions. In 
other words, the homo sacer shows how power constrains humans by excluding 
them, even though it may appear that power exists for the sake of human beings. 
Agamben says, “We shall give the name relation of exception to the extreme form 
of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion” (ibid., 
18). Power lies precisely where something that should have been an exception is 
transformed into normality.
The homo sacer is intrinsically exceptional because it is excluded from the 
law. Paradoxically, however, the law confirms its identity through the exclusion 
in the first place. Homo sacer sustains the law through its very exclusion, 
maintaining its identity by its inability to be offered as sacrifice. “Just as the law, 
in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer applying 
and in withdrawing from it, so homo sacer belongs to God in the form of 
unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form of being able to 
be killed. Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life” (ibid, 
82).
Exceptions are no longer exceptions. On the contrary, they go straight to 
the heart of the legal dimension. Levi and Agamben both mention the use of the 
term muselmann (“Muslim”) in Auschwitz (Levi 1996, 88-90; Agamben 2002, 41-
44) to describe inmates who, suffering from starvation and exhaustion, became 
resigned to their impending death. Muselmänner had lost the  characteristics 
of living human beings because they had been actively ignored by society, like 
walking corpses. So the muselmann would have been an exception, except in 
Auschwitz where he became the norm. Paradoxically, although he lacks the will 
and the awareness to testify to the realities of Auschwitz, he is the true witness of 
Auschwitz. As Agamben says, “Auschwitz is precisely the place in which the state 
of exception coincides perfectly with the rule and the extreme situation becomes 
the very paradigm of daily life. But it is this paradoxical tendency of the limit 
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situation to turn over into its opposite that makes it interesting” (Agamben 2002, 
49).
The Sewol disaster should also have been an exception, but instead it laid 
bare the true face of everyday life—during both the sinking itself and the recovery 
operation. For a long while now, exception has been part of everyday life, right at 
the heart of it. Civilizations brought it into being and its existence is sustained by 
the human power system. Power is something that exists for the sake of itself, not 
others. It exists by making humans disposable, and is therefore inherently violent. 
Two years on since the sinking of the Sewol, the recovery operation is still deemed 
a mission impossible. Of course, citizens are well aware that responsibility gets 
bigger as one approaches the center of power, but the law itself does not recognize 
this. This is because power is maintained by controlling the law, and power exists 
for itself alone through the exclusion of humanity; it is also because civilization 
is sustained by creating exceptions, similar to the homo sacer. In that way, crises 
are resolved not by law, power, or civilization, but by the passage of time and 
forgetting. A nation-state is in fact an empty space rather than a holistic entity 
that encompasses law, power, and civilization. This may be the fundamental 
disaster.
Dangerous Disasters, Unethical Responses
Disasters are the most explicit evidence of a risk society, something that was 
analyzed by Ulrich Beck. In a risk society, there is an intensification of unrest 
among individuals, but no political apparatus capable of resolving it. This is 
because the political system itself is producing the risks. Beck claims that the 
political subject of a risk society “is only the victimization of all by more or less 
tangible massive dangers” (Beck 1992, 48). However, it is difficult to mobilize 
victims on a large scale, so Beck doubts whether intangible, universal afflictions 
can be organized politically at all, and asks “Is ‘everyone’ capable of being a 
political subject?” (ibid., 49).
Traditional hierarchical societies use utopian equality to build momentum 
for the accumulation of wealth, while a risk society increases shared anxiety 
about safety.  Reality proves otherwise, however, because solidarity born out 
of anxiety seldom organizes itself into a political power (ibid., 49-50). On the 
contrary, a community of unrest has extremely fragile foundations that are easily 
undermined by the presence of contradictory information. That is why, in a risk 
society, the victims of risks find it hard to come together, and politics falls into a 
vacuum.
This is similar to the distinction drawn by Reinhold Niebuhr in his Moral 
Man and Immoral Society between individual morality and collective immorality. 
Niebuhr asserts that ethical individuals do not necessarily make an ethical 
society. Individuals, by nature, are moral in that they have feelings of fraternity, 
sympathy, and understanding for each other and consider each other’s interests. 
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However, “in every human group there is less reason to guide and to check 
impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs 
of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who 
compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships” (Niebuhr 1960, xi-xii). 
For this reason, groups cannot easily acquire morality like individuals. Collective 
selfishness, which combines the selfish impulses of all individuals, does not allow 
space for rational thinking. For this reason, societies cannot solve crises of their 
own creation.
Over two years after  the sinking of the Sewol, for example, the site of the 
disaster still serves as a space for plots, negotiations, and competition among the 
groups that were largely responsible for the accident. So far, Koreans have only 
confirmed the following: the search for the missing was actually a business deal 
designed to minimize accountability, maximize profits, and maintain and expand 
the power holders’ grasp on power. More effort was expended on escorting the 
president to perform various ceremonies than was used to search for the missing, 
and the president has done no more than deliver a belated ambiguous apology. 
The salvage contractor, who had an exclusive deal with the Korea Coast Guard 
and the owner of the Sewol, valued the contract more than the rescue operations. 
The Korea Coast Guard, through an exclusive contract with a specific company, 
secured a space in which it could draw its own conclusions about the cause and 
the effects of the disaster. The owners of the vessel put profit before safety by 
overloading the ferry, and their sole concern was to minimize their responsibility. 
The Sewol disaster was the result of capitalist greed, condoned and endorsed by 
the state,6 but even the Blue House has tried to avoid responsibility by arguing 
that it is not a “control tower” for disasters. By establishing a Ministry of Public 
Safety under the prime minister’s supervision, the Blue House has avoided legal 
accountability in the event of national crises (Woo 2014, 130, 180). The Sewol 
Special Law, supposedly enacted to facilitate investigation of the sinking, has been 
revealed to be part of a strategy for minimizing and avoiding accountability or 
expanding authority. Even the religious organization linked to the vessel’s owner 
has sought to control religious sentiments by conducting various ceremonies 
and misappropriated donations collected from its congregation. The Korea 
Coast Guard, the Blue House, and the vessel’s owners, as well as the religious 
organization, tried in their various ways to benefit from the victims’ suffering. 
Faced with this huge tragedy, each individual mourns the dead, while the 
response of society as a whole is anything but ethical. 
In this context, disasters are inevitable. According to Perrow’s theory of 
“normal accidents” mentioned above, disasters nowadays are not the products of 
deviant social systems but are normal occurences produced by our current social 
systems. As the scope of human civilization becomes bigger and more delecate, 
disasters are bound to increase in scale. Disasters are simply unavoidable in 
current societies, be they modern industrial or neoliberal capitalist. Of course, 
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the theory of safety culture holds that the establishment of organizational practice 
that prioritizes trust over efficiency will help avoid disasters. However, the logic 
established by otherizing nature tells us otherwise; disasters brought about by 
nature’s counterattacks are inevitable. Responding to technological issues with 
technology alone is a logical fallacy, an example of circular reasoning. In societies 
where disasters are normalized, accidents and disasters are things that must 
be endured. The inability to empathize with others and see things from their 
perspective means that disasters even bigger than the sinking of the Sewol are 
deeply embedded in our routines, eventually becoming part of our culture.
Governance of Disaster with a Human Face
The Face of the Other
So how can we deal with this seemingly hopeless situation? The first step might 
be to acknowledge the problems as they are and then to seek out a ray of hope. 
As Nietzsche looked forward to the advent of the ubermensch—the superman—
in the midst of nihilism, we have no alternative but to try to reduce the frequency 
and severity of disasters.
Human beings need to step out of their individualized space and rebuild 
their links with others. We cannot rely on an inadequate state. According to 
Levinas, we must revive our existential sensitivity that enables us to  recognize 
the face of the other (Levinas 1985, chap. 7), which implies listening to the 
other’s inner voice.  To Levinas, the “face” is not an object; it makes an appeal 
and expresses itself. The recognition of a face opens the door to a whole new 
dimension. Levinas called the way the face presents itself “revelation.” The parable 
of the Good Samaritan, the story of someone reading an absolute demand in 
the face of a man who had been set upon by robbers, is a good example of this 
(Gospel According to Luke 10: 29-37). When faced with another’s pain and 
helplessness, the ego recognizes its own sin and its unjust possession and abuse 
of wealth and power. That is why the Good Samaritan looked after the injured 
victim (Kang 1996, 235-241). The victim’s face, or the face of the other, became 
the One who disclosed universal humanity.7 The One is an other before it becomes 
reified, someone who appeals to you. The One is the other who inspires the ego’s 
sense of ethics. One solution to the tragedies that beset us today may be to listen 
to the appeal of the other. Zizek observed that truth is realized by action, not 
by just talking; and Levinas argued that leaving one’s neighbor in distress is the 
very origin of immorality (Levinas 1998, 98-99). He criticized such an unethical 
attitude and insisted that we reflect on our responsibility to others. He considered 
this responsibility to others as “the most important structure that forms the basis 
of subjectivity.” In other words, existing as a subject is possible through one’s 
relationships with others (Levinas 1985, 95-101). 
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Furthermore, that also explains why Niebuhr never gave up on the idea of 
social morality, in spite of his belief that society was immoral. He never ceased 
his quest for social justice, although he considered society to be collectively 
selfish. As a Christian theologian and ethicist, Niebuhr looked forward to the 
spread of individual morality in global politics. He saw that the human capacity 
to transcend–in other words, the ability to objectify oneself–empowers the 
individual to overcome reality within reality, and such an ability enables the 
theological ideal to be realized, albeit partially, even in the realm of relative 
reality. To Niebuhr, man’s aspiration to transcend his desires is a fundamental 
prerequisite for solving today’s political problems (Chun 2012, 29-32). This 
indicates that while Niebuhr believed society to be intrinsically immoral, he never 
gave up the hope that the morality of the individual could be applied to global 
politics.
The Spiritually-Planned Governance of Disaster
As disasters become more large-scale and complex, we need to find an answer 
to this fundamental question, what makes human beings human? Only then 
is it meaningful to ask why we need to overcome disasters. From a religious 
perspective, we need to recover the type of faith Smith called the universal trait 
of human beings, or what Harvey Cox and Marcus Borg refer to as the heart of 
human beings. Faith in this context does not refer to a particular religion that 
only goes as far as accepting a specific doctrine. Faith refers to human beings’ 
innate transcendence that enables them to face themselves by reflecting upon 
existential reality and to become what they should have been in the first place. 
This very transcendence is something that will allow them to overcome disasters. 
This coincides with the notion of transcendence proposed by Zizek, a self-
proclaimed materialistic atheist. To him, transcendence is not something so 
surreal and distant that it cannot respond. Instead, it has already crossed into the 
dimension of this world, cracking into it, making the idea of revolution feasible 
through the cracks. If transcendence does not intervene in the world, it is not 
transcendence. Transcendence is inherent. Zizek claims that God is so immanent 
within humans that he is aware of his own non-existence. He says: “only atheists 
can truly believe: the only true belief is belief without any support in the authority 
of some presupposed figure of the big Other” (Zizek 2009, 101). In this way, Zizek 
reestablishes God as a main topic of discourse even as he talks about the death of 
God, paradoxically arguing that discourse on God is not meaningless. Completely 
incarnated and humanized, God’s transcendence will penetrate the pain and, 
eventually, put an end to the cries of despair through the gap. Humanized and 
historically inherent transcendence is most prominent when it recognizes the face 
of the other and empathizes with its suffering.
In other words, this is an action firmly dedicated to an empathic relationship. 
Disasters originate from the otherization of nature and reification of human 
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beings. Therefore, it is essential to recover and to internalize otherized nature; to 
recover betweenness and relationship; and to revive empathic sensitivity toward 
human beings. Understanding human beings as human betweenness—not as 
atomized substances but as togetherness—and establishing an empathic and 
symbiotic social model is fundamental to minimizing and even removing the 
causes of disasters.
Brahman is Atman—the highest order of the universe and the essence of 
the individual are the same; all living things have the nature of the Buddha; 
human beings are made in the image of God; bearing the spirit within—all 
people bear the god of Heaven in their minds, etc. These religious principles from 
East and West provide a way of understanding God, human beings, and nature 
monistically or as beings of the between. 
These are the premises that guide human beings to see others as entities 
within nature and nature as fundamental within human beings, ultimately 
making them divine. In an era of disasters, it is necessary to revive such premises, 
as they may provide the primary impetus for disaster prevention. This is why 
disaster governance must be implemented with a religious attitude that recognizes 
the face of the other.
Notes
This is a translated and extensively revised version of Chan Su Yi, 2014, “Jaenan: Jayeonui 
tajahwa, inganui samulhwa” [Disaster: The Otherization of Nature and the Reification of 
Human Beings], Jonggyomunhwa bipyeong 26: 195-229.
1. Nuclear fission can only function in a predictable way and be of any use to human 
beings when it is controlled by people who completely understand nuclear theory. If those 
who control it do not abide by this theory, horrendous disasters will occur. 
2. This disaster equation [(vulnerability + hazard) / capacity = disaster] illustrates how 
professionalism increases the likelihood of disasters by raising the value of the numerator 
(vulnerability plus hazards) and lowering the denominator (capacity). It is a useful tool 
for analyzing the disaster as a phenomenon, but it is not useful for analyzing the essential 
cause of disasters. Nature is a force behind vulnerability, danger, and capacity. Disasters are 
the result of civilization’s abstraction and objectification of nature and the absence of love 
for human beings. Disasters increase in scope in direct proportion to the sum of hazards—
human casualties, property loss, socioeconomic chaos, etc.—and vulnerability to such 
hazards; and if the capacity to cope with them is inadequate, disasters only expand in scope 
which is how professionalism increases the extent of disasters.
3. The Daegu subway fire was a complex-and-exploding disaster, which simultaneously 
displayed characteristics of a complex-and-amplifying disaster. The authors claim that 
disasters in Korea tend to be normal accidents with complex characteristics.
4. Homo sacer means: sacrificed to God; holy, consecrated, serious as well as accursed, 
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horrible, and detestable. (Morwood, James, ed. 2005. Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press). If we combine these various contradictory definitions, 
we can translate the term as “something that cannot be approached.” Homo sacer can then 
be defined as “a man who cannot be approached.”
5. For instance, Sextus Pompeius Festus defined homo sacer as follows: “The sacred 
man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to 
sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first 
tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred according to 
the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide’. This is why it is customary for a bad or 
impure man to be called sacred.” (Agamben 1998)
6. On September 22, 2011, the Busan Regional Ocean & Fisheries Administration 
sent a notification to the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education recommending that 
ferries be used for student field trips (Woo 2014, 105-106). It was immoral to encourage 
teachers and students to travel on old and illegally adapted ferries on their school trips 
to Jeju Island in an attempt to promote the marine transportation industry that had been 
in decline since 2009. The Korean government also introduced legislation designed to 
encourage the development of the cruise industry. This law, which is still going through 
the parliament, permits ships to be used for twenty to thirty years beyond their normal 
lifespan. While the Japanese government sought to ensure safety by limiting the lifespan of 
vessels, Korea sought to maximize profits by extending ships’ lifespans (ibid., 105-129). The 
recommendation of the Busan Regional Ocean & Fisheries Administration was not a direct 
cause of the Sewol disaster, but it shows how such actions by official bodies can contribute 
to disasters. One might say that the sinking of the Sewol was a disaster that was bound to 
happen.
7. Zizek criticizes this type of other. As there is no love in philanthropy, the face of an 
other that gives absolute orders is equivalent to the Nazis’ perception of the Jews, that they 
were inferior beings, or in other words, the “enemy.” (Zizek 2008, 55-56)
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